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THE NSA IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:  




Revelations that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) conducts 
substantial surveillance abroad1 have reinvigorated debate about the 
applicability of human rights law to surveillance performed outside a 
nation’s territory.  Recently, scholars have asserted that human rights law, 
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),2 either does or should give foreign nationals abroad rights against 
U.S. surveillance.3  Since the U.S. Supreme Court has generally extended 
rights against search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment only to U.S. 
citizens, legal permanent residents, or those physically present in the United 
States,4 surveillance of non-U.S. persons abroad is typically not problematic 
under domestic law.  The United States, however, may also have 
obligations under international law.  President Obama’s speech and policy 
directive on privacy in January 2014 proclaiming that “[a]ll persons should 
be treated with dignity and respect” and have “legitimate privacy interests 
in the handling of their personal information”5 has intensified the focus on 
U.S. international obligations. 
 
*  Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.  J.D., Columbia Law 
School; B.A., Colgate University.  I thank Ken Anderson for comments on a previous draft. 
 1. See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS., LIBERTY AND 
SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 132–41 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S REVIEW 
GRP.]. 
 2. Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 3. See Marko Milanovic, Foreign Surveillance and Human Rights, EJIL:  TALK! (Nov. 
27, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/foreign-surveillance-and-human-rights-part-3-models-of-
extraterritorial-application/; cf. David Cole, We Are All Foreigners:  NSA Spying and the 
Rights of Others, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 29, 2013, 12:48 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/
29/foreigners-nsa-spying-rights/ (critiquing U.S. surveillance policy as shortsighted); 
Jennifer Granick, Foreigners and the Review Group Report:  Part 2, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 
19, 2013, 12:47 PM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/12/19/foreigners-review-group-report-part-
2/ (same). 
 4. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).  This Article will 
refer to U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents as “U.S. persons.” 
 5. See Press Release, The White House,  Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Policy 
Directive/PPD-28, at 5 (Jan. 17, 2014) [hereinafter PPD-28] (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/2014sigint.mem_.ppd_.rel_.pdf; 
see also Benjamin Wittes, The President’s Speech and PPD-28:  A Guide for the Perplexed, 
LAWFARE (Jan. 20, 2014, 11:02 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/01/the-presidents-
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Article 17 of the ICCPR protects individuals from “arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with [their] privacy, family. home or correspondence.”6  Under 
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR, each state that is a party to the agreement must 
“respect and . . . ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction” the rights provided for in the Covenant.7  Debate has 
centered on the meaning of Article 2(1) for the United States since well 
before the NSA revelations. 
While the United States’ position has not been uniform since the 
ICCPR’s drafting, its current position is that the ICCPR does not apply 
extraterritorially.8  To support this position, the United States relies on the 
language of Article 2(1), which limits a state’s duty to individuals “within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”9  However, international 
tribunals and most scholars reject this view.  Many argue that the United 
States’ reading of Article 2(1) is less persuasive than it appears to be, and 
that to achieve the ICCPR’s purpose, a state must “respect” and “ensure” 
ICCPR rights both within its territory and anywhere else it has “effective 
control” of either territory or persons.10  A broad view of both Article 2(1) 
and Article 17’s bar on arbitrary interference with privacy would present 
substantial legal obstacles to the NSA’s foreign surveillance. 
This Article takes a middle ground that acknowledges that the United 
States has an extraterritorial duty under Article 2(1) to “respect” ICCPR 
rights including privacy, but then construes Article 17’s prohibition on 
 
speech-and-ppd-28-a-guide-for-the-perplexed/#.Ut23FKMo6po (analyzing the president’s 
speech and policy directive). 
 6. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 17. 
 7. Id. art. 2(1). 
 8. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UN COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, at annex I (2005), available at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/55504.htm#annex1; see also Michael J. Dennis, Application of 
Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military 
Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 123–24 (2005); Ashley Deeks, Does the ICCPR 
Establish an Extraterritorial Right to Privacy?, LAWFARE (Nov. 14, 2013, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/11/does-the-iccpr-establish-an-extraterritorial-right-to-
privacy/#.Ut26AaMo6po.  The latest report of the United States may reflect a softening of 
the U.S. position, although it is not a definitive shift. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOURTH 
PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UN COMMITTEE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS ¶ 505 
(2011), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/179781.htm#iii (noting the prior U.S. 
position, while acknowledging that the United States is “mindful” of the contrary U.N. 
Human Rights Committee view); see also Charlie Savage, U.S. Seems Unlikely To Accept 
That Rights Treaty Applies to Its Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2014, at A6.  While the U.S. 
government will apparently not shift its stance, the matter generated substantial internal 
debate. Cf. Memorandum from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
(Oct. 19, 2010), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/
1053853/state-department-iccpr-memo.pdf (urging that the United States agree that ICCPR 
requires that it “respect” rights extraterritorially). 
 9. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 2(1). 
 10. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589, 647–
50 (2011); see also Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and To Ensure:  State Obligations and 
Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 72, 74 (Louis Henkin ed., 
1981). 
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arbitrary interference narrowly to permit NSA surveillance abroad, given 
the legal constraints already in place governing the NSA’s efforts.  With 
respect to Article 2(1), this Article makes two arguments.  First, it asserts 
that the text of Article 2(1), viewed in light of other language in the ICCPR 
and the agreement’s purpose, requires extraterritorial application.  
However, that application extends only to “respect” for ICCPR rights 
displayed in direct acts of U.S. officials, and not to a broader duty to 
“ensure” that non-U.S. officials or entities provide such rights.  Second, the 
piece argues that the current “effective control” test for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is too narrow to do justice to the pervasive capabilities of 
electronic surveillance.  To better meet this challenge, the piece suggests a 
“virtual control” test that would make the ICCPR applicable when a state 
can assert control over an individual’s communications, even though it 
lacks control over the territory in which the individual is located, or over 
the physical person of that individual. 
However, the threshold Article 2(1) issue is only a prelude to the merits, 
which entail an inquiry into whether U.S. surveillance abroad is an arbitrary 
intrusion into privacy prohibited by Article 17 of the ICCPR.  This portion 
of the piece also makes two arguments.  First, I note that, despite 
differences in tone and emphasis, European law on privacy and national 
security surveillance does not diverge significantly from U.S. law.  The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has upheld provisions in both 
British and German law that permit bulk surveillance of communications of 
foreign nationals abroad based on very broad substantive criteria, including 
national security, “serious criminal offences,” and economic threats, as long 
as officials query bulk data with identifiers linked to those criteria.11  
Strikingly, the ECHR has understood that more detailed specification of 
conduct allowing surveillance would trigger a costly trade-off, as 
wrongdoers “adapt” their behavior to avoid surveillance and slip underneath 
the radar. 
Second, I argue that even where the European and U.S. approaches 
diverge, the complementarity principle provides a measure of deference to 
U.S. approaches.  Complementarity counsels deference based on both the 
imperatives of sovereignty12 and other provisions of international law, 
including the law of armed conflict and U.N. Security Council resolutions 
that require global cooperation to combat terrorism.  The deference 
prompted by complementarity allows a state to practice what I call 
procedural pluralism:  flexibility in the procedural safeguards the state 
chooses, as long as those safeguards provide meaningful constraints on 
government.  The U.S. surveillance policy fits within this zone of 
deference, because of the robust role of the Foreign Intelligence 
 
 11. See, e.g., Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 309 (upholding the German 
bulk content collection program). 
 12. Michael A. Newton, A Synthesis of Community Based Justice and Complementarity, 
in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND ‘LOCAL OWNERSHIP’:  ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 
JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS (Carsten Stahn ed., forthcoming) (manuscript at 5–10), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2081904. 
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Surveillance Court (FISC), which contrasts with the more limited role 
played by courts in Europe regarding surveillance requests.  This increased 
judicial role compensates for the greater recourse that European law 
provides to subjects of surveillance, particularly given the significant 
exceptions to that recourse approved by European tribunals. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I briefly summarizes NSA 
surveillance abroad, including the parameters set out in President Obama’s 
January 2014 speech and policy directive.  Part II addresses the exterritorial 
application of the ICCPR.  It describes the U.S. position and the opposing 
position taken by scholars who stress broad treaty coverage, and suggests a 
middle way.  Part III argues that, based on complementarity and substantial 
overlap between NSA surveillance and programs approved by the ECHR, 
U.S. surveillance abroad meets the standard set out in Article 17 of the 
ICCPR.  This Part also briefly suggests further reforms that would reinforce 
the case for the compliance of the United States. 
I.  NSA SURVEILLANCE ABROAD 
Edward Snowden’s disclosures have thus far centered on two NSA 
programs.  One is domestic—the so-called metadata program, operated 
pursuant to section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,13 and entailing the bulk 
collection of call record information, including phone numbers and times of 
calls.14  The other is foreign—the PRISM program, operated pursuant to 
section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).15  Under 
section 702, the government may conduct surveillance targeting the 
contents of communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be 
located abroad when the surveillance will result in acquiring foreign 
intelligence information.16  The FISC must approve any government 
request for surveillance under section 702, although these requests can 
 
 13. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act  of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 
115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006)). 
 14. Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection:  Statutory and Constitutional 
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2344774; Steven G. Bradbury, Understanding the NSA Programs:  
Bulk Acquisition of Telephone Metadata Under Section 215 and Foreign-Targeted 
Collection Under Section 702, 1 LAWFARE RES. PAPER SERIES 1 (Sept. 1, 2013), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Bradbury-Vol-1-No-3.pdf; David 
S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 1 LAWFARE RES. PAPER SERIES 1 (Sept. 
29, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Lawfare-Research-
Paper-Series-No.-4-2.pdf; cf. Peter Margulies, Evolving Relevance:  The Metadata Program 
and the Delicate Balance of Secrecy, Deliberation, and National Security (Roger Williams 
Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 146, 2014), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2400809 (arguing that section 215 should be read as 
entailing a fiduciary duty to safeguard both privacy and national security in light of fluid 
threats and technological shifts). 
 15. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (Supp. V 2011). 
 16. Id. § 1881a(a). 
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describe broad types of communications without identifying particular 
individuals.17 
Under section 702, “foreign intelligence information” that the 
government may acquire includes a number of grounds related to national 
security, such as information relating to an “actual or potential attack” or 
“other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power.”18  It also includes information relating to possible sabotage19 and 
clandestine foreign “intelligence activities.”20  Another prong of the 
definition appears to sweep more broadly, including information relating to 
“the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.”21  Despite the 
greater breadth of this provision, President Obama informed a domestic and 
global audience that U.S. intelligence agencies seek a narrow range of 
information centering on the national security and foreign intelligence 
concerns described above.22  While the U.S. intelligence agencies acquire a 
substantial amount of data that does not fit under these rubrics, the 
president’s speech confirmed that U.S. analysts do not rummage through 
such data randomly or for invidious purposes.23  A scatter-shot approach of 
this kind would be unethical, illegal, and ineffective.  Instead, NSA officials 
query communications using specific “identifiers” such as phone numbers 
and email addresses that officials reasonably believe are used by non-U.S. 
persons abroad to communicate foreign intelligence information.24  The 
government must also have in place minimization procedures to limit the 
acquisition, retention, and dissemination of nonpublic information about 
U.S. persons.25  The NSA deletes all irrelevant content, including content 
from non-U.S. persons, after five years.26 
In acknowledging the “legitimate privacy interests” of both U.S. and 
non-U.S. persons, President Obama affirmed the U.S. commitment to core 
principles in January 2014.27  First, he narrowed the operating definition of 
 
 17. See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP., supra note 1, at 135–37.  The attorney general and 
director of national intelligence can issue a determination that permits surveillance without 
prior FISC approval when exigent circumstances so require because without immediate 
action “intelligence important to the national security of the United States may be lost or not 
timely acquired.” 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(c)(2).  In this exigent situation, the attorney general and 
director of national intelligence must submit a certification to the FISC seeking authorization 
within seven days. Id. § 1881a(g)(1)(B). 
 18. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1)(A). 
 19. Id. § 1801(e)(1)(B). 
 20. Id. § 1801(e)(1)(C). 
 21. Id. § 1801(e)(2)(B). 
 22. See PPD-28, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP., supra note 1, at 136; cf. In re Gov’t’s Ex Parte 
Submission of Reauthorization Certification for 702 Program, slip op. at 15–16, 22 (FISA 
Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) (Bates, J.), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/
2013/08/162016974-FISA-court-opinion-with-exemptions.pdf (describing the government’s 
use of designated “facilities” and “selectors” with links to terrorism or other foreign 
intelligence information, including not only communications to or from phone numbers or e-
mail addresses, but communications “about” these identifiers). 
 25. See In re Gov’t’s Ex Parte Submission, slip op. at 14. 
 26. Id. at 24. 
 27. PPD-28, supra note 5, at 5. 
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foreign intelligence information, limiting it to “information relating to the 
capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements 
thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists.”28  
In addition, he asserted that the NSA would engage in bulk collection of 
communications for purposes of “detecting and countering” terrorism, 
espionage, nuclear proliferation, threats to U.S. forces, and financial crimes, 
including evasion of duly enacted sanctions.29  Addressing anticipated 
concerns that these limits still left the NSA with too much discretion, 
President Obama declared what the United States would not do.  First, it 
would not collect communications content “for the purpose of suppressing 
or burdening criticism or dissent, or for disadvantaging persons based on 
their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion.”30  Second, it 
would disseminate and store information regarding any person based on 
criteria in section 2.3 of Executive Order 12,33331:  cases involving 
“foreign intelligence or counterintelligence,” public safety, or ascertainment 
of a potential intelligence source’s credibility.32 
Of course, President Obama’s speech did not quell the complaints of 
NSA critics.  One could argue that even the description the president 
provided has legal flaws under domestic and/or international law.  One can 
also argue that the president’s policy directive, statutory provisions, and 
case law cannot wholly eliminate the possibility of systemic or individual 
abuse of NSA authority.  That said, there are compelling reasons for 
treating the president’s speech and directive as an authoritative and binding 
statement of U.S. policy.  The most compelling reason may be the simplest:  
no American president has ever been so forthright on the subject of 
intelligence collection, and few heads of state around the globe have 
ventured down the path that President Obama chose.33  That alone counsels 
treating President Obama’s guidance as more than “cheap talk.” 
II.  EXTRATERRITORIALITY UNDER THE ICCPR 
Despite President Obama’s candor about some aspects of U.S. 
intelligence collection, the president said nothing about U.S. duties under 
the ICCPR.  Because the section 702 program affects the communications 
of foreign nationals, that issue is vital.  The threshold question concerns the 
extraterritorial reach of the ICCPR’s obligations.  Some bodies, like the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) and some commentators, take the 
sweeping view that the ICCPR requires a state party to both respect and 
ensure that individuals are provided treaty rights within that state party’s 
 
 28. Id. at 2 n.2 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 204–05 (1981), amended 
by Exec. Order No. 13,470, 3 C.F.R. 218, 227 (2008), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. 
§ 401 app. at 934–43 (Supp. V 2011)). 
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. Id. at 3. 
 31. Id. at 6. 
 32. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 204–05, amended by Exec. Order No. 
13,470, 3 C.F.R. 218, 227, reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. at 934–43. 
 33. See Wittes, supra note 5. 
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territory or whenever an individual falls under the state’s jurisdiction.34  
The United States now asserts a starkly contrasting position:  the ICCPR 
never applies extraterritorially.35  I submit that the best path lies between 
these poles:  considering the ICCPR’s purpose of promoting human rights, 
but also taking into account the practical issues with requiring a state to 
both respect and ensure observance of those rights around the globe. 
A.  The Narrow View 
The United States has for some years (although not always) taken the 
view that the text of Article 2(1) of the ICCPR does not support imposing 
extraterritorial application of the treaty’s duties.36  Article 2(1) binds each 
state party “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”37  
The principles of treaty construction in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties38 (VCLT) (accepted as customary by the United States) require 
reading a treaty “in accordance with the ordinary meaning . . . [of its] 
terms.”39  The “ordinary” meaning of two conditions connected by the 
conjunctive, “and,” is that an obligation arises only upon satisfaction of 
both conditions.  In other words, a state incurs obligations under the ICCPR 
only to individuals who are both “within its territory” and “subject to its 
jurisdiction.”40  This reading rules out extraterritorial application of the 
ICCPR’s substantive duties.  However, although this reading seems 
plausible at first blush, a fuller reading of the ICCPR’s text raises 
substantial doubts. 
As the distinguished scholar (and former International Court of Justice 
judge) Thomas Buergenthal has noted, this reading of the text of Article 
2(1) clashes with other provisions of the agreement.  At least two of the 
 
 34. CCPR General Comment 31:  Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 80th Sess., Mar. 29, 2004 ¶ 10, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter CCPR General Comment 
31], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/58f5d4646e861359c1256ff600533f5f?
Opendocument; see also Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 72, 74. See generally Sarah H. 
Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
225, 232–62 (2010) (discussing issues of extraterritorial application under the U.S. 
Constitution and international law). 
 35. Brian J. Bill, Human Rights:  Time for Greater Judge Advocate Understanding, 
ARMY LAW., June 2010, at 54, 58; Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, What Is the Role of 
International Human Rights Law in the War on Terror?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 803, 835 
(2010); Dennis, supra note 8, at 123–24. 
 36. See Cleveland, supra note 34 (plotting the course of the U.S. position over time); 
Dennis, supra note 8, at 123–24; Beth Van Schaack, The United States’ Position on the 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations:  Now Is the Time for Change, 90 
INT’L L. STUD. 20, 57–59 (2014), available at http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/
a88e97e5-11ec-4dfb-a013-4cfa5f8efe5a/The-United-States--Position-on-the-
Extraterritoria.aspx. But see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that the 
U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, was within U.S. jurisdiction for purposes of the 
Constitution’s Suspension Clause, although the base was on Cuba’s territory). 
 37. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). 
 38. May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
 39. Id. art. 31(1). 
 40. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 35, at 825. 
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ICCPR’s substantive provisions, those involving the right of the nationals 
of a state to return to that state41 and the right not to be tried in absentia,42 
make no sense if they do not protect individuals at least temporarily outside 
of a state’s territory.43  The provision regarding nationals’ right to return 
would become a nullity if the ICCPR had no application outside a state’s 
sovereign territory.  The prohibition on trial in absentia would similarly 
have to be read to include entirely arbitrary distinctions between defendants 
absent from a trial but within a state’s territory and those outside that 
territory.  While scholars sympathetic to the narrow reading of the ICCPR 
have urged reading these particular provisions as exceptions to a general 
rule against extraterritorial application of the ICCPR,44 this position seems 
unduly facile.  If the ICCPR’s substantive provisions do not square with a 
narrow reading of Article 2(1), that reading is less plausible than a reading 
of Article 2(1) in isolation suggests.  Even looking only at the agreement’s 
text, therefore, the “ordinary meaning” of the treaty as a whole modifies the 
meaning we should ascribe to the conditions set forth in Article 2(1). 
These doubts expand if we move beyond the text of the ICCPR to other 
items that are integral to interpretation under Article 31 of the VCLT, 
including the drafting history of the provision.  Eleanor Roosevelt, the U.S. 
chief delegate to the United Nations during the initial drafting of the 
ICCPR, insisted in 1950 on the mention of “territory” in Article 2(1) for a 
more modest reason than the rationale now posited by the United States.  
The key fear of the United States, as articulated by Roosevelt, was that in 
some cases exterritorial application would impose upon the United States 
affirmative duties to enforce a comprehensive regime of rights within each 
of the defeated Axis powers that the United States and its allies had 
occupied after World War II.  The early wording of Article 2 imposed on a 
signatory state the duty to “guarantee to all persons residing on their 
territory and within their jurisdiction the rights defined in the present 
covenant.”45  The use of the term “guarantee” could have resulted in a U.S. 
commitment to assure the protection of rights within the states of the former 
Axis—countries whose commitment to democratic institutions was nascent 
and highly uncertain.  As Roosevelt stated, the United States wanted to 
avoid “assuming an obligation to ensure the rights recognized in [the 
covenant] to the citizens of countries under United States occupation.”46 
Ensuring those rights would have presented significant difficulties for the 
United States under both domestic and international law.  To properly 
ensure such rights, the United States might have been required to enact 
legislation establishing the rights of citizens of the then-occupied territories 
 
 41. See ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 12(2), (4). 
 42. Id. art. 14(3)(d). 
 43. See Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 74. 
 44. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 35, at 835. 
 45. See U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., 193d mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.193 (May 15, 
1950) [hereinafter HRC 193d mtg.] (emphasis added). 
 46. U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., 194th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.194 (May 16, 1950) 
[hereinafter HRC 194th mtg.] (emphasis added). 
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of Germany, Austria, and Japan.47  Because the United States never 
intended to annex those states, whose continued sovereignty was central to 
the postwar plans of the Allies, Congress might not have had constitutional 
authority to legislate regarding rights of citizens of the Axis powers.  Even 
absent constitutional objections, such legislation would have been 
extraordinarily difficult politically, a concern which all of the drafters of the 
ICCPR understood. 
Moreover, “ensuring” the rights of Germans and other Axis citizens 
would have conflicted with the international law of occupation.  Under that 
law, an occupying power must respect the prior laws of the occupied state.  
While an occupying power has some authority to decline to enforce laws 
that violate fundamental human rights, ensuring Axis compliance with all of 
the ICCPR’s provisions would have exceeded this minimum standard.48  
Under the law of occupation, compliance with those provisions should have 
been left, as it was, to officials of the occupied state upon the conclusion of 
occupation. 
The reluctance of the United States to stand surety for the former Axis 
powers did not indicate a refusal to accept responsibility for direct actions 
taken by U.S. personnel abroad.  At one point in the debates over the 
drafting of the ICCPR, Eleanor Roosevelt acknowledged that “troops, 
although maintained abroad, remained under the jurisdiction of the State.”49  
This acknowledgment, in response to comments by delegates from other 
states about the scope of state duties, strongly suggests that the United 
States conceded responsibility for the acts of its own personnel in the 
course of occupation.  The acknowledgement is evidence that the United 
States did not regard the “jurisdiction” and “territory” requirements of 
Article 2(1) as conjunctive in all cases, but only in those situations that 
imposed unmanageable duties on states to ensure foreign governments’ 
compliance.50 
 
 47. See HRC 193d mtg., supra note 45, at 13.  In this passage, Roosevelt explained that, 
without the amendment including the term “territory” conjunctively with “jurisdiction,” the 
treaty 
could be interpreted as obliging a contracting party to adopt legislation applying to 
persons outside its territory . . . [including persons] in the occupied territories of 
Germany, Austria and Japan, as persons living in those territories were in certain 
respects subject to the jurisdiction of the occupying Powers but were in fact 
outside the legislative sphere of those Powers. 
Id. 
 48. See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation:  Applying the Laws of War 
and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 580, 585 (2006); cf. Marco Sassòli, Transnational 
Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law 23–24 (Harvard Univ. Program on 
Conflict Resolution Occasional Paper Series, No. 6), available at http://www.hpcrresearch.
org/sites/default/files/publications/OccasionalPaper6.pdf (discussing links between the law 
of occupation and the law on conflict with violent transnational groups such as al Qaeda). 
 49. HRC 194th mtg., supra note 46, at 9. 
 50. While the current U.S. position on extraterritorial application of the ICCPR has 
contributed to a certain global cynicism about the U.S. view of international law, the United 
States has often displayed high regard for international law and taken a leadership role, as 
Eleanor Roosevelt’s participation in the drafting of the ICCPR illustrates. See, e.g., Rebecca 
Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. 
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Moreover, the subsequent drafting history of the ICCPR reveals that the 
twin conditions imposed by Article 2(1) also focused on limiting the reach 
of the term, “ensure,” regarding a state’s obligations to its nationals abroad.  
Without textual restrictions, a state party to the ICCPR might be required to 
ensure the safety of its citizens abroad against the actions of another state in 
which those citizens were located.  While a state may use diplomatic 
channels to protect its nationals abroad, it cannot ensure their safety against 
the actions of other states.  The language adopted in Article 2(1) made clear 
that state parties to the treaty did not assume this impossible burden.51  In 
addition, Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR supports a 
disjunctive test, by acknowledging HRC authority to entertain complaints 
from “individuals subject to [a State Party’s] jurisdiction.”52 
B.  The Protective Approach 
If the narrow approach favored by the United States fails to persuade, so 
does the sweeping endorsement of extraterritoriality provided by the HRC, 
which receives reports from states regarding their compliance with the 
ICCPR and hears individual complaints against states that have signed on to 
the First Optional Protocol.  The HRC has asserted that states are always 
bound, within their territory and in other areas subject to their jurisdiction, 
to both respect and ensure that individuals receive rights under the 
ICCPR.53  Because this approach focuses on maximum protection of human 
rights, I call it the protective approach.54  Unfortunately, the protective 
approach embodies a stilted view of the ICCPR’s text and purpose that 
 
INT’L L. 359, 391–412 (2013) (discussing the importance to policymaking of U.S. mandatory 
reporting to U.N. treaty bodies such as the Committee Against Torture); cf. Jack Goldsmith 
& Daryl Levinson, Law for States:  International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1835 (2009) (describing international and constitutional law as 
coordinated games in which parties including the United States relinquish short-term 
benefits to realize long-term gains); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 
NEB. L. REV. 181, 194–99, 203–05 (1996) (describing how the United States interacts with 
transnational bodies, courts, and nongovernmental organizations in a dialogue framing 
international norms). But see JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:  LAW AND 
JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 60 (2007) (critiquing the incentive structure of 
nongovernmental organizations as too often skewed against U.S. positions); Kenneth 
Anderson, “Accountability” As “Legitimacy”:  Global Governance, Global Civil Society 
and the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 841, 842–44 (2011) (same); J. Andrew Kent, 
A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 510–24 
(2007) (suggesting caution in accounts of interaction between international law and 
American constitutionalism, especially in the formation of judicially enforceable rights). 
 51. See Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 74. 
 52. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976).  The Optional Protocol provides less compelling evidence of a disjunctive reading, 
because it was drafted after the original ICCPR, is optional, and has not been ratified by the 
United States. See Status of Ratification of Human Rights Instruments, UNITED NATIONS 
HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUM. RTS. (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/HRBodies/HRChart.xls. 
 53. CCPR General Comment 31, supra note 34, ¶ 10. 
 54. See Peter Margulies, The Fog of War Reform:  Change and Structure in the Law of 
Armed Conflict After September 11, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1417, 1422 (2012). 
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unduly discounts the concerns with manageability that Eleanor Roosevelt 
articulated in the early debates on the treaty’s drafting. 
In finding that the conditions in Article 2(1), “within the territory” and 
“subject to the jurisdiction,” apply disjunctively to duties of the states to 
both respect and ensure all rights under the ICCPR, the HRC relies on the 
“object[] and purpose[]” of the ICCPR.55  Indeed, in invoking the object 
and purpose of the ICCPR under Article 31 of the VCLT, the HRC also 
invokes Article 26 of the VCLT, which declares the familiar customary 
principle that states must interpret their treaty obligations in good faith.56  
According to the HRC, the ICCPR’s object and purpose is to extend human 
rights as comprehensively as possible around the globe and leave as few 
gaps as possible in human rights protection.57 
Unfortunately, the protective view ignores the first component that any 
good faith interpreter should consult:  the text of the source.  Article 31(1) 
of the VCLT requires consideration of the “ordinary meaning” of treaty 
terms.58  While, as Buergenthal noted in his 1981 article, Article 2(1) could 
have been drafted more clearly,59 that failure of drafting does not license 
interpreters to import their own policy preferences without regard to the 
text.  The language of Article 2(1) may not require a conjunctive reading of 
“territory” and “jurisdiction” per the U.S. position, but, even more clearly, 
it does not require a disjunctive reading that imposes on states a duty to 
both respect and ensure treaty rights.  A more plausible reading limits the 
duty to ensure to cases where an individual is both within a state’s territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction.60  While some have argued that the rights-
promoting nature of a multilateral treaty like the ICCPR justifies less regard 
for the agreement’s text, an inappropriately expansive reading of the text 
sacrifices essential virtues of a treaty:  predictability, legitimacy, and 
connection to state consent.61 
The HRC’s view, particularly its insistence on a comprehensive reading 
of a state’s duty to “ensure” other states’ or entities’ compliance with treaty 
rights, fares no better in accounting for the ICCPR’s purpose or drafting 
history.  The HRC failed to recognize that a treaty’s purposes, like those of 
a constitution or statute, may be the product of crosscutting interests and 
 
 55. CCPR General Comment 31, supra note 34, ¶ 5. 
 56. This is known as the pacta sunt servanda principle. See Eliav Lieblich, Intervention 
and Consent:  Consensual Forcible Interventions in Internal Armed Conflicts As 
International Agreements, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 337, 361 (2011) (describing that principle as 
holding that “agreements must be kept”). 
 57. See CCPR General Comment 31, supra note 34, ¶¶ 3–4. 
 58. VCLT, supra note 38, art. 31(1). 
 59. Buergenthal, supra note 10, at 74. 
 60. See Cleveland, supra note 34, at 252. 
 61. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1935, 1960–61 (2002) (noting that the perception that human rights treaty interpretation 
is “legitimate in form . . . [but] less so in practice” can undermine adherence to treaty 
norms).  For an insightful look at questions of treaty interpretation, see David S. Jonas & 
Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty:  Three Interpretive Methods, 43 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565 (2010). 
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agendas.62  Eleanor Roosevelt’s concern about open-ended state obligations 
is a countervailing factor that helped shape the ICCPR’s object and 
purpose.  States like the United States that signed and ratified the ICCPR 
because they counted on this tempering of their obligations are in a difficult 
spot under the HRC’s expansive rule.  That difficulty has the perverse effect 
of tempering state appetites for ratifying future human rights treaties.63 
C.  A Modified Purposive Approach to the Threshold 
Issue of ICCPR Applicability 
Fortunately, there is an alternative to the sweeping approach taken by the 
HRC, reflected in the jurisprudence of the ECHR.  In addressing the 
threshold question of the ICCPR’s applicability, the ECHR has interpreted 
Article 2(1) in light of both the treaty’s protective purpose and the difficulty 
of imposing comprehensive duties on states when the state’s footprint in a 
particular domain is fleeting.64  This approach requires a showing of de 
facto jurisdiction or control over either persons or territory to trigger the 
state’s duty to “respect” an individual’s rights under the ICCPR.  A state 
has the additional duty to “ensure” the provision of those rights only when 
the individuals claiming rights are both within the state’s territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction.65 
In Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, the ECHR explained that the test of 
jurisdiction could be met either through control of an individual or a 
geographic area.66  The court noted that jurisdiction follows when a state’s 
agents “exercise[] control and authority over an individual.”67  
 
 62. Cf. City of Chi. v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 339 (1994) (“It is not unusual for 
legislation to contain diverse purposes that must be reconciled.”); William W. Buzbee, The 
One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 179, 190–92 
(2000) (discussing ambiguities in statutory interpretation); Curtis J. Mahoney, Note, Treaties 
As Contracts:  Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE 
L.J. 824 (2007) (arguing for reading treaties according to their text, on the theory that states 
parties ascertain their duties in reliance on the text’s plain meaning).  I do not make this 
point to endorse a rigid reliance on treaty text, which is often ambiguous.  I argue only that 
inquiries into treaty purposes often yield ambiguity as well. 
 63. Cf. Stephen C. Sieberson, The Treaty of Lisbon and Its Impact on the European 
Union’s Democratic Deficit, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 445, 452–53 (2008) (asserting that the 
unease of European states with constraints imposed by the European Union (EU) has been 
exacerbated by the EU’s “non-majoritarian institutions” that are not accountable to the 
public for their decisions).  I do not argue here that U.N. bodies like the HRC are fatally 
flawed because they are not majoritarian in nature.  Rather, I argue that this aspect of U.N. 
bodies should prompt greater modesty in substantive positions such bodies adopt. 
 64. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589 
(2011). 
 65. For a thoughtful analysis that limits a state’s duty to “ensure” rights to its own 
territory, but pegs the duty to “respect” to direct state actions that infringe on rights 
anywhere around the globe, see MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES:  LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011), Marko Milanovic, From 
Compromise to Principle:  Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights 
Treaties, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 411 (2008), and Milanovic, supra note 3. 
 66. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 647–48. 
 67. Id. at 648; see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶¶ 109–10 (July 9) 
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Alternatively, a state can exercise effective control over a geographic area, 
either directly, through its own armed forces, or through a “subordinate 
local administration.”68  In Al-Skeini, the court found that the United 
Kingdom, along with the United States, had assumed the “public powers” 
typically wielded by a sovereign state pursuant to the U.N. Security Council 
Resolution authorizing the occupation of Iraq by a multinational force after 
Saddam Hussein’s overthrow.69 
Importantly, the ECHR has moved away from the view that jurisdiction 
is an all-or-nothing inquiry.  The facts of a case may demonstrate that a 
state had jurisdiction over a particular individual, even if the state did not 
have overall control of the territory where it gained control over the 
individual.  For example, in Ocalan v. Turkey,70 a case involving the 
handover in Kenya to Turkish officials of a suspect sought in Turkey for 
terrorist-related crimes, the ECHR noted that “the applicant was effectively 
under Turkish authority and therefore within the ‘jurisdiction’” of Turkey 
after the handover was completed in Kenya.71  In other words, a state need 
not exercise all “public powers” to meet the jurisdictional test; even 
exercise of “some” public powers may be sufficient.72  Followed to its 
logical conclusion, permitting jurisdiction to hinge on the exercise of 
“some” public powers suggests that one state’s jurisdiction is not 
necessarily exclusive of all other states:  in Ocalan, Turkish officials in 
Kenya had jurisdiction over the suspect they had received from Kenyan 
authorities, even though Kenya clearly retained jurisdiction over its own 
territory, where the transfer of the suspect had occurred.73  If this is true, 
jurisdiction may be divisible in a way suggested in the next subsection:  
jurisdiction over electronic communications may, as a de facto matter, be 
 
(holding that the ICCPR applied to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank).  My citation of the 
International Court of Justice’s Wall decision does not reflect agreement with its narrow 
view of the application of the right to self-defense only to “armed attacks” committed by 
other states, as opposed to nonstate actors such as terrorist groups. See id. ¶ 139; cf. 
Margulies, supra note 54, at 1473 n.253 (criticizing this aspect of the Wall opinion). 
 68. Al-Skeini, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 648. 
 69. Id. at 650–51. 
 70. 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 131. 
 71. Id. at 164; cf. Cleveland, supra note 34, at 266 (discussing Ocalan); Jules Lobel, 
Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the Extraterritorial Constitution, 36 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 307, 356 (2011) (same). 
 72. See Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 355.  Because Bankovic held 
that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries were not responsible for harm 
incurred as a result of NATO’s bombing of a Serbian-controlled broadcast station during the 
1999 Kosovo campaign, commentators have viewed it as imposing a narrow test of effective 
control that requires some plenary control of persons or territory.  The power to cause 
substantial consequences, including death, through direct state action, was deemed 
insufficient. See MILANOVIC, supra note 65, at 25, 57 (arguing that the ECHR in Bankovic 
adopted an unduly rigid conception of the reach of the ICCPR); see also Cleveland, supra 
note 34, at 262–64 (discussing Bankovic); Gerald L. Neuman, Understanding Global Due 
Process, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 376–77 (2009) (same).  However, the assertion in 
Bankovic that an exercise of “all or some of the public powers” was necessary to find 
jurisdiction, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 355, should be read in tandem with subsequent 
decisions of the ECHR, such as Ocalan and Al-Skeini, which broadened the ICCPR’s reach. 
 73. Ocalan, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 164–66. 
2150 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
shared between countries, even when only one of those states has 
jurisdiction over territory and persons.  Dividing jurisdiction in this way 
establishes the ICCPR’s threshold applicability to NSA surveillance abroad. 
D.  Virtual Control Is Also a Basis for Jurisdiction 
I argue elsewhere that the growth of the virtual world of cyber and other 
electronic communication challenges traditional international law tests of 
state control, including the “effective control” test that represents the best 
synthesis of the ECHR’s jurisprudence.74  Notions of control that were 
adequate to analyze the actions in real time taken overseas by state officials 
or their alleged agents do not translate well into the cyber domain.  
Deterrence of problematic conduct in the cyber arena requires a broader 
test, which I call the virtual control standard.  This test should also govern 
the showing necessary to support extraterritorial application of the ICCPR 
to surveillance abroad. 
I argue in my forthcoming article that the effective control test does not 
provide adequate deterrence against states using nonstate actors to launch 
intrusions against other states in the cyber domain.  The law of state 
responsibility for private actors imposes a demanding test on a state 
claiming that it has been victimized by another state through private actors:  
the responsible state must specifically direct the offending nonstate actors, 
or least train and equip them for the specific activity giving rise to the 
victim state’s complaint.  This demanding test makes sense for the realm of 
kinetic action, such as bombs or bullets.  In that realm, I suggest, actions are 
often immediately apparent, while preparations are elaborate, creating built-
in deterrents.  In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua case, for example, the International Court of Justice cited kinetic 
actions, including killings, kidnappings, and torture committed by the 
Nicaraguan Contra forces.75  It also cited evidence of training that the 
Nicaraguan Contra forces received from the U.S. government in coercive 
interrogation.76  Because of the nature of kinetic action, evidence to meet 
the effective control standard will be accessible to victim states.  A victim 
state can survey visible damage to persons or property caused by a kinetic 
strike within its territory.  Moreover, responsible states will also often 
confront significant obstacles of manageability, time, and distance in the 
use of kinetic means by nonstate agents.77 
 
 74. See Peter Margulies, Sovereignty and Cyber Attacks:  Technology’s Challenge to the 
Law of State Responsibility, 15 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2014). But see INT’L 
GRP. OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
WARFARE 32–33 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) (arguing that the “effective control” test 
should apply to cyber warfare). 
 75. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, 64 (June 27). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Liz Sly, U.S. Aid to Syrian Rebels Is Halted, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2013, at A1 
(discussing the problems with providing aid to rebels because of growing al Qaeda influence 
among rebel groups).  That said, the difficulty of containing cyber attacks may also be a 
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As I suggest in my forthcoming article, however, the effective control 
test is inadequate for the cyber and communications realm.78  Here, 
physical control over persons or territory is unnecessary.79  The NSA can 
remotely control much of the communication of a foreign national abroad.  
It can eavesdrop on those communications and may be able to filter the 
communications received by that individual or alter the content the 
individual receives.80  According to press reports, the NSA can break many 
forms of encryption used around the world because of “back doors” it has 
engineered in many software systems.81  The NSA apparently also has the 
capacity to gain control of computers not directly connected to the internet, 
because of the implantation of tiny radio transmitters in many computers 
manufactured in the United States and elsewhere.82  Consider as well that 
the United States has relationships with internet and telecommunications 
companies that facilitate surveillance.  Since, at the present time, much of 
the world’s internet traffic is routed through the United States, that virtual 
power is unprecedented.  Moreover, the United States has the capacity to 
directly access undersea cables and other carriers of internet and telephonic 
communications.83  The extended duration and seamlessness of U.S. control 
 
prudential factor that limits their use. See David E. Sanger, Syria War Stirs New U.S. Debate 
on Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2014, at A1. 
 78. Margulies, supra note 74; Ashley Deeks, Extraterritorial Right to Privacy:  A 
Response by Luca Urech, LAWFARE (Nov. 15, 2013, 6:54 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2013/11/extraterritorial-right-to-privacy-a-response-by-luca-urech/#.Ut24nKMo6po. 
 79. Cf. David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling Attribution, HARV. 
NAT’L SECURITY J. (2011), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Vol.-2_Clark-
Landau_Final-Version.pdf (discussing aspects of cyber intrusions). 
 80. See Shane McGee, Randy V. Sabett & Anand Shah, Adequate Attribution:  A 
Framework for Developing a National Policy for Private Sector Use of Active Defense, 8 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 13 & nn.87–89 (2013) (noting that the Stuxnet virus implanted in Iranian 
centrifuges’ systems for supervisory control and data acquisition altered the systems’ 
reporting of the centrifuges’ rate of revolution and temperature level, deceiving Iranian 
operators into running machines at high levels that resulted in their destruction); Jeremy 
Rabkin & Ariel Rabkin, Navigating Conflicts in Cyberspace:  Legal Lessons from the 
History of War at Sea, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 209–10 (2013) (noting that the Stuxnet 
intrusion “disable[d] Iranian centrifuges while concealing its operation from Iranian 
technicians, by sending false signals to monitoring equipment”). 
 81. See Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Miniscule for All-Consuming N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 3, 2013, at A1.  The revelations regarding the NSA’s reach have sparked debate about 
the future of Internet governance, with some states calling for greater state control and state 
capacity for storage that would limit the influence of the United States, whose companies 
and facilities currently handle a huge portion of global internet traffic. See generally Melissa 
E. Hathaway & John E. Savage, Stewardship of Cyberspace:  Duties for Internet Service 
Providers, CYBER DIALOGUE (2012), http://www.cyberdialogue.citizenlab.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/2012papers/CyberDialogue2012_hathaway-savage.pdf (discussing models of 
internet governance); see also Vincent J. Vitkowsky, Snowden Affair and Control of the 
Internet, ADVISEN (2013), https://www.advisen.com/HTTPBroker?action=jsp_request&id=
articleDetailsNotLogged&resource_id=208291146. 
 82. See David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, N.S.A. Devises Radio Pathway into 
Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2014, at A1. 
 83. See In re Gov’t’s Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification for 
702 Program, slip op. at 5 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) (Bates, J.), available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/162016974-FISA-court-opinion-
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in the virtual sphere constitutes an ongoing state presence that is in some 
ways more pervasive than states’ dominance within their physical territory.  
A narrow standard requiring physical control does not do justice to the 
challenge of rapidly evolving technology in a changing world.84  The 
virtual control test supplies a broader standard that meets this challenge. 
Having made this argument, a caveat is in order.  While the extent of 
U.S. surveillance capability should affect the threshold coverage of the 
ICCPR, it does not provide an answer on the ultimate legal merits of U.S. 
policies.  The merits of NSA surveillance abroad hinge not on the 
capabilities of the United States but on how the substantial restraints that 
the United States imposes on those capabilities square with the ICCPR’s 
arbitrariness standard for intrusions on privacy.  I turn to these questions in 
the next section of the Article. 
III.  THE LEGAL MERITS OF NSA SURVEILLANCE ABROAD 
UNDER THE ICCPR 
Having determined that the ICCPR applies as a threshold matter, we next 
ask whether NSA surveillance abroad is “arbitrary” or “unlawful” under 
Article 17.  I assume in what follows that most surveillance conducted on 
non-U.S. persons outside the United States is lawful under the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and U.S. statutes.  Therefore, this 
section focuses on whether NSA surveillance is “arbitrary.”  I conclude that 
NSA surveillance is not arbitrary under Article 17, because it targets 
terrorists, national security threats, and espionage in a tailored fashion. 
In reaching this conclusion, I rely on the principle of complementarity, 
which seeks to harmonize a body of international law with other 
international law doctrine and with the prerogatives of states.  To integrate 
 
with-exemptions.pdf (discussing “upstream” collection of contents of communications for 
which at least one party is located overseas). 
 84. On a superficial level, the virtual control that the United States can exercise abroad 
may appear less significant than the power to use deadly force on foreign territory.  
Arguably, the United States has a greater impact when it uses a drone to kill an agent of al 
Qaeda in Pakistan than when it eavesdrops on an al Qaeda agent in Germany. Cf. Jennifer C. 
Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield:  A Framework for Detention and Targeting 
Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1191 (2013) (noting uncertainty 
regarding application of human rights law to extraterritorial targeted killings); Michael W. 
Lewis & Emily Crawford, Drones and Distinction:  How IHL Encouraged the Rise of 
Drones, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1127, 1142–49 (2013) (discussing the use of drones under 
international humanitarian law).  At first blush, this argument seems to blunt the case for a 
virtual control standard, since Bankovic and the other ECHR cases cited above would not 
classify a country conducting a drone strike overseas as possessing sufficient “public 
powers” over persons or territory to justify a finding of jurisdiction.  Indeed, the “public 
power” test seems to exclude surveillance of electronic communications by a foreign state, 
since such surveillance is often engaged in covertly, not publicly. 
  While these doubts are formidable, they should not carry the day.  The effective 
jurisdiction test applicable to a state’s physical footprint overseas was not designed to cover 
virtual or electronic surveillance.  As suggested above, the pervasiveness of the 
communications capability of the United States, as well as the secrecy attending use of that 
power (at least prior to Edward Snowden’s disclosures), argues for a broader test of 
jurisdiction. 
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all of the relevant international law doctrines, I read Article 17 in tandem 
with the law of armed conflict and U.N. Security Council resolutions on 
counterterrorism.  To reconcile Article 17 with these norms and with 
sovereign prerogatives, I advance a model of procedural pluralism that 
gives states flexibility in creating protections if they honor core principles 
such as notice, oversight, and minimization but does not mandate the same 
itemized menu of safeguards required in European Union (ECHR) 
jurisprudence.  In fact, as I note, ECHR jurisprudence permits exceptions to 
procedural safeguards, including exceptions designed to preserve the 
effectiveness of national security surveillance, that are not radically 
different from U.S. practice.  I note, however, that certain reforms of NSA 
surveillance, such as a public advocate, would further strengthen 
compliance, affirming that NSA programs are consistent with the ICCPR.  
President Obama’s initiatives, including a clearer articulation of the bases 
for U.S. surveillance abroad, buttress this case. 
A.  The Primacy of Complementarity 
The concept of complementarity is a valuable lens for examining the 
lawfulness of states’ conduct under the ICCPR.  The principle of 
complementarity holds that international law norms are implemented in a 
complex landscape that requires actions by states and reconciliation with 
other rules of international law.  Complementarity has two facets relevant to 
this piece:  (1) complementarity accords a measure of deference to states in 
their good faith interpretation of their international obligations; and 
(2) complementarity also endeavors to harmonize disparate international 
rules and norms.  A proper vision of complementarity eschews an all-or-
nothing approach, in which international law trumps state policy or vice 
versa, and instead tailors each body of law to the needs of the other 
whenever possible.  The same tailoring approach is appropriate for 
harmonizing disparate international rules.  Each facet of complementarity 
demonstrates U.S. compliance with the ICCPR in its surveillance abroad. 
1.  Complementarity and State Law 
Tribunals in Europe and elsewhere acknowledge the importance of 
complementarity between state and international law.85  Complementarity 
requires engagement between international tribunals and sovereign states.86  
A measure of deference for state determinations reinforces collaboration 
 
 85. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl. para. 10, art. 1, July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (noting that the ICC was established as “complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions”). 
 86. See Jennifer Trahan, Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the International 
Criminal Court’s Crime of Aggression?  Considering the Problem of “Overzealous” 
National Court Prosecutions, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 569, 578 (2012) (“[C]omplementarity 
‘forces the [International Criminal Court] and national legal systems to engage with one 
another.’” (citing Pål Wrange, The Crime of Aggression and Complementarity, in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS 
REVIEW 591, 592 (R. Bellelli ed., 2010))). 
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with international institutions.  Jettisoning complementarity would 
jeopardize that link.  Indeed, states joined the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in reliance on that tribunal’s recognition of the complementarity 
principle.87  Observance of the complementarity principle mitigated the risk 
to sovereignty that the ICC posed.  Construing the margin of appreciation, 
complementarity requires tribunals to accord some deference to a state’s 
decisions about war crimes prosecution of that state’s own officials.88  
Similarly, the ECHR has granted a measure of deference, which it describes 
as a “margin of appreciation,” to a state’s interpretation of its duties under 
the European Convention.89  For example, the ECHR has deferred to a 
state’s need to curb free expression to promote child safety90 and curb 
extremist violence.91  Analysis of U.S. overseas surveillance programs 
should trigger a similar quantum of deference. 
2.  Complementarity and International Norms 
Complementarity is also a core principle in reconciling conflicts among 
different international law norms.  International law is a vast canvas whose 
strands sometimes pull in different directions.  Interpreting a particular 
provision should entail the least disruption with the entire enterprise.  
Moreover, certain provisions, principles, or entire bodies of law within the 
whole may be more recent or more specifically tailored to particular 
situations.92  More specific provisions should inform the interpretation of 
other international norms. 
Such provisions include U.N. Security Council resolutions enacted after 
September 11 to address the threat of terrorism.  For example, Resolution 
137393 requires that states “[t]ake the necessary steps to prevent the 
commission of terrorist acts, including [the] provision of early warning to 
other States by exchange of information.”94  The United States and other 
 
 87. See id. at 578–79. 
 88. See id. at 579–80. 
 89. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16, 17 (1976); see also 
Robert D. Sloane, Human Rights for Hedgehogs?:  Global Value Pluralism, International 
Law, and Some Reservations of the Fox, 90 B.U. L. REV. 975, 983 (2010) (explaining that 
the margin of appreciation provides flexibility for sovereign states to “implement or interpret 
human rights in ways that may be sensitive or responsive to prevailing social, cultural, and 
other norms within their polities”); cf. Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference:  The 
Judicial Power and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1766–70 
(2007) (discussing U.S. domestic law approaches to deference). 
 90. See generally Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). 
 91. Zana v. Turkey, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533 (upholding the conviction of an 
official who, after attacks on civilians by a terrorist group, described the group as a “national 
liberation movement”).  I cite these free expression cases not to recommend changes in the 
U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment, which grants speech greater protection, but solely to 
illustrate how complementarity works in European tribunals. 
 92. See CCPR General Comment No. 31, supra note 34, ¶ 11 (stating, in discussing the 
role of the law of armed conflict in interpreting the ICCPR, that “more specific rules of 
international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the . . . interpretation of 
Covenant rights [and] both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive”). 
 93. See S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 2(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 94. Id. 
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states that engage in counterterrorist measures can enhance their ability to 
fulfill this obligation by conducting surveillance on suspected terrorists and 
sharing the information thereby acquired.  Similarly, subsection 2(d) of the 
resolution mandates that states “[p]revent those who finance, plan, facilitate 
or commit terrorist acts from using [states’] territories for those purposes 
against other States or their citizens.”95  While this duty applies most 
clearly to a state conducting surveillance on persons within its borders, in 
today’s mobile and interconnected world, such persons may have regular 
contacts with persons abroad.  In addition, subsection 3(a) urges states to 
share “operational information . . . regarding actions or movements of 
terrorist persons or networks” and, inter alia, “use of communications 
technologies by terrorist groups.”96  A reading of the ICCPR that inhibits 
achievement of these goals by imposing burdensome limits on surveillance 
would not effectively harmonize the ICCPR with the international post-9/11 
counterterrorism framework imposed by the U.N. Security Council. 
The law of armed conflict97 also requires a more flexible interpretation of 
the ICCPR in the surveillance arena.  The International Court of Justice has 
held that the law of armed conflict constitutes lex specialis that, by virtue of 
its more specific provisions, should inform human rights law in armed 
conflicts.98  Reconnaissance and surveillance of another party to an armed 
conflict is an accepted incident of war.99  The law of armed conflict does 
not preclude espionage, and permits a wide range of observation of enemy 
forces.100  This observation can be clandestine or open.  A noninternational 
armed conflict, like the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda and 
associated forces, does not diminish a state’s prerogative to engage in such 
observation of its adversaries.101  A rigid application of the ICCPR that 
 
 95. Id. ¶ 2(d). 
 96. Id. ¶ 3(a). 
 97. See generally YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2d ed. 2010); MICHAEL N. SCHMITT ET AL., INT’L INST. OF 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
(2006), available at http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/The%20Manual%20on%20the%
20Law%20of%20NIAC.pdf. 
 98. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 262 (July 8); Neuman, supra note 72, at 387 (defending “modifying the content of 
. . . treaty norms . . . by importing relevant rules (if any exist) from the law of armed conflict, 
by means of lex specialis or similar arguments”). 
 99. Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems and International 
Humanitarian Law:  Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 595, 597–601 
(2012) (discussing surveillance and reconnaissance in the context of the use of drones). 
 100. See Richard R. Baxter, So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’:  Spies, Guerillas, and 
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 323, 328–33 (1951) (questioning whether espionage is a 
violation of the law of nations); cf. John C. Dehn, The Hamdan Case and the Application of 
a Municipal Offence:  The Common Law Origins of ‘Murder in Violation of the Law of 
War,’ 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 63, 68 n.26, 73–79 (2009) (noting and elaborating upon 
Baxter’s view). 
 101. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006) (holding that the conflict with al 
Qaeda is “not of an international character” for purposes of the Geneva Conventions’ 
Common Article 3); cf. Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict:  
A “Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. 
L. REV. 46, 53, 68–69 (2009) (arguing that the noninternational armed conflict model was 
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precludes such observation would fundamentally reshape the law of armed 
conflict.  That disregard for another corpus of international law would not 
do justice to the principle of complementarity. 
While, as we shall see, the ECHR jurisprudence on surveillance is not 
wholly inconsistent with complementarity, especially as regards state law, 
other European tribunal decisions on counterterrorism are less promising on 
harmonizing international norms.  In Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom,102 Kadi 
v. European Court of Justice,103 and A. and Others v. United Kingdom,104 
European courts failed to adequately harmonize individual rights guarantees 
with global counterterrorism measures.  In Al-Jedda, the ECHR rigidly 
defined detention authority in an armed conflict, limiting it to peacetime 
modes such as quarantine or detention prior to a criminal trial.105  The 
ECHR declined to read in to the European Convention an acknowledgment 
that the law of armed conflict requires broader detention authority.106  In 
failing to give Britain detention authority required to effectuate a U.N. 
Security Council resolution authorizing occupation in post–Saddam 
Hussein Iraq, the ECHR also failed to show appropriate respect for the role 
of the Security Council in ensuring world order.  In A. and Others, the 
ECHR was unduly rigid in applying a proportionality analysis to Britain’s 
derogation from the European Convention’s detention rules, where Britain 
sought to detain a foreign national whom it suspected of terrorism but could 
not deport because of concerns that the detainee would be subject to 
mistreatment if returned to his country of origin.107  In Kadi v. European 
Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice applied procedural 
safeguards rigidly.  The court thus failed to respect Security Council 
resolutions that curbed financial assistance to terrorist groups108 and the 
U.N. ombudsperson regime that had provided relief to those wrongly 
targeted by counterterrorism sanctions.109 
 
originally designed to cover internal rebellions or civil wars, and that conflict with a 
transnational terrorist organization like al Qaeda requires a different paradigm); Michael W. 
Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 293, 306–08 (2012) 
(cautioning against conflation of civil wars and conflicts with transnational armed groups). 
 102. App. No. 27021/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 23 (2011). 
 103. Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P & C-595/10 P, INFOCURIA—CASE-LAW CT. 
JUST. (July 18, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
139745&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1914364. 
 104. 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 137. 
 105. Al-Jedda, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 843–48. 
 106. Id.; cf. James Farrant, Is the Extra-Territorial Application of the Human Rights Act 
Legally Justified?, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 833, 833–54 (2009) (critiquing an earlier opinion in 
the case). 
 107. A. & Others, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 222–24. 
 108. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1989, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1989 (July 1, 2011). 
 109. For discussion of the ombudsperson system, see SUE E. ECKERT & THOMAS J. 
BIERSTEKER, WATSON INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, BROWN UNIV., DUE PROCESS AND 
TARGETED SANCTIONS:  AN UPDATE OF THE “WATSON REPORT” 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/Watson%20Report%20Update%2012_12.pdf. 
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3.  Complementarity and Procedural Plurality 
To honor complementarity, we should embrace a pluralist account110 of 
appropriate procedural safeguards.  Pluralism has gone hand in hand with 
complementarity in the work of a significant number of tribunals and 
scholars.  Often pluralism comes into play when assessing the 
appropriateness of different state remedial frameworks in the wake of 
persecution and atrocities.  We can apply a similar perspective to the 
procedural safeguards that should accompany surveillance. 
An important strand in law and commentary on remedial frameworks 
holds that no one model fits all situations in coping with the aftermath of 
mass human rights violations, such as South Africa’s apartheid.  South 
Africa famously endorsed a truth and reconciliation model that stressed 
dialogue and transparency regarding past wrongs over formal legal 
accountability.111  In many settings in the developing world, formal legal 
accountability came to be seen as a model too rigid to foster transitions 
from oppression.  The plurality of the formal and informal models that were 
used suggests that, beyond baseline requirements, states should have 
choices in the frameworks they adopt.  An absolute amnesty for wrongdoers 
was out of bounds.112  However, once states rejected this course of action, a 
range of frameworks were acceptable, including truth and reconciliation and 
exemplary punishment of leaders in abuses, together with de facto amnesty 
for many followers in the interest of forging political peace. 
We can apply this model to procedural safeguards accompanying certain 
intrusive governmental action, including surveillance.  On this view, one 
would ask if a given framework provided a sound foundation:  notice about 
grounds for surveillance, oversight of surveillance programs, and deterrence 
of arbitrary official conduct, including targeting of political opponents or 
disfavored ethnic, racial, or religious groups.  A state could choose from a 
number of procedural options that would accomplish these goals, without 
being locked into specific measures that might not fit with that state’s 
history or traditions.  Procedural pluralism would also minimize conflicts 
with other international rules, such as the law of armed conflict and 
Security Council resolutions mandating counterterrorism efforts.  With 
procedural pluralism as a backdrop, we can turn to European precedents on 
surveillance policy. 
 
 110. See PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM:  A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW 
BEYOND BORDERS (2012); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1155 (2007). 
 111. Azanian People’s Org. v. President of the Republic of S. Afr. 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) 
(S. Afr.); cf. MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 
(2007) (praising restorative-justice mechanisms that promote a “‘forgiveness process 
characterized by truth telling, redefinition of the identity of the former belligerents, partial 
justice, and a call for a new relationship’” (quoting WILLIAM J. LONG & PETER BRECKE, WAR 
AND RECONCILIATION:  REASON AND EMOTION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3 (2003))); Newton, 
supra note 12, at 13 (“‘[J]ustice’ is most legitimate and . . . effective when it is most 
responsive to the demands of the local population.”). 
 112. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:  The Duty To Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2604–06 (1991). 
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B.  European Case Law on Security Surveillance 
While European surveillance law may appear, on first encounter, to 
require more privacy protections than U.S. law,113 several caveats are in 
order.  First, as we shall see, European courts do not require judicial 
authorization of surveillance,114 which in some form is central to most U.S. 
surveillance programs, including those concerning the content of overseas 
communications.  Second, the ECHR has not indicated hostility to bulk 
collection of internet or telecommunications data; indeed, some years ago it 
approved a German program that queried a massive database of 
communications content.115  Third, the ECHR, recognizing that national 
security threats may be “difficult to define in advance,”116 has not required 
that a statute specify detailed criteria justifying surveillance.  Fourth, the 
ECHR has recognized that a state can assemble a database including 
communications by foreign nationals located outside of that state.117  Fifth, 
even when the ECHR has imposed procedural requirements that exceed 
those that U.S. courts have imposed, those safeguards stem in large part 
from interpretation not of the ICCPR, but of the European Convention on 
Human Rights,118 which does not bind the United States.  Sixth, the United 
States and Europe both follow minimization requirements for foreign 
communications, although those requirements are not spelled out as clearly 
in U.S. law. 
While there are differences between European and U.S. law, these 
differences often concern tone and emphasis, not substance.  The ECHR has 
subjected European states to requirements, such as notification of the 
targets of surveillance and recourse for those wrongly targeted, that are 
usually not available in the United States for national security surveillance.  
Even in Europe, however, courts have permitted exceptions that 
substantially ease compliance for governments engaged in surveillance. 
 
 113. See Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty:  A Comparative 
Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 633–34 (2007).  This 
article predated the Snowden revelations and was based on earlier reports of U.S. 
surveillance. 
 114. See Kennedy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26839/05, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 207 (2010); 
cf. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 54, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013) (by Frank La Rue) (noting that, in Britain, the Secretary of 
State authorizes surveillance). 
 115. See Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 309. 
 116. See Kennedy, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 256. 
 117. See Weber, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 332–34. 
 118. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
8(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights] (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.”); id. art. 8(2) (“There shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”). 
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1.  Overlap Between the U.S. and European Models 
The caveats above push back against the conventional narrative that 
Europe provides greater privacy protections.119  Consider the judicial role 
in surveillance.  In the United States, the Fourth Amendment or federal 
legislation requires some judicial role in the authorization of the acquisition 
of the content of communications, or even in the ongoing collection of 
phone records.  In contrast, although European courts stress the need for 
some independent review of surveillance requests, courts need not be the 
agency performing this role.  In Weber v. Germany,120 for example, the 
ECHR approved a framework that entrusted review to a body called the 
G 10 Commission.121  While the G 10 Commission must by law include a 
senior judicial official, it is not a court.122  Federal courts have a wide range 
of remedies at their disposal in the United States, and federal judges enjoy 
the protection of lifetime tenure.123  The German G 10 Commission may 
not have similarly effective tools and lacks the same protections.124 
In Weber, the ECHR also approved a surveillance program that gathered 
the contents of communications by foreign nationals abroad.  The ECHR 
referred to Germany’s program as “strategic monitoring.”125  German 
officials assembled this vast database without any “particularized suspicion 
of wrongdoing.”126  They then used search terms to query the data.127  The 
U.S. section 702 program uses methods that are substantially similar to the 
German approach.128 
Crucially, the ECHR has recognized that detailed statutory criteria 
governing surveillance would be counterproductive.  While noting the 
importance of “forseeability” among the public that surveillance is possible 
and the perils of “unfettered” discretion,129 the ECHR has held that 
 
 119. For the classic treatment of such comparisons, see James Q. Whitman, The Two 
Western Cultures of Privacy:  Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004) (arguing 
that the United States values privacy as a means for securing liberty, while Europeans value 
dignity, defined as not subjecting individuals to unwanted public gaze). But see Bignami, 
supra note 113 (arguing that the European approach also protects liberty). 
 120. 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 309. 
 121. Id. at 318, 319, 327. 
 122. Id. at 320. 
 123. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 124. Judges on the German Federal Constitutional Court serve twelve-year terms. See 
Susanne Baer, The Difference a Justice May Make:  Remarks at the Symposium for Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 92, 93 (2013). 
 125. Weber, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 315. 
 126. See Bignami, supra note 113, at 640; Paul M. Schwartz, German and U.S. 
Telecommunications Privacy Law:  Legal Regulation of Domestic Law Enforcement 
Surveillance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 751, 778–82 (2003). 
 127. Weber, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 316 (explaining that the German government would 
monitor telecommunications “with the aid of catchwords which remained secret”). 
 128. See In re Gov’t’s Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification for 702 
Program, slip op. at 15–16, 22–23 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) (Bates, J.), available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/162016974-FISA-court-opinion-
with-exemptions.pdf; see also supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
 129. Kennedy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26839/05, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 207, 253–54 
(2010). 
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surveillance based on “national security” concerns is appropriate.130  Ruling  
that the term, “national security,” is not unduly vague, the ECHR found that 
the term has been “frequently employed in both national and international 
legislation,” and that protecting national security is “one of the legitimate 
aims” of the underlying statute.131  More detailed criteria, the court 
cautioned, would lead to national security threats “adapt[ing their] conduct” 
to stay just outside the statute’s reach.132  Pursuant to the directive issued 
simultaneously with President Obama’s January 2014 speech, the NSA 
must also limit itself in exactly the same way that European courts require, 
focusing on national security and crime.133  U.S. policy squarely precludes 
surveillance abroad for other purposes, such as suppressing speech critical 
of the United States, discriminating against racial, religious, or ethnic 
groups, or gaining a competitive advantage for U.S. companies.134 
The ECHR has also recognized that states need greater leeway in 
surveillance of foreign nationals located abroad.  The ECHR has held that 
surveillance by one state generally does not impinge on the sovereignty of 
another state in which the target of the surveillance is located.135  No 
interference with sovereignty occurs, the ECHR has asserted, as long as the 
state conducting surveillance does not gain access to “fixed telephone lines” 
or other physical communications instrumentalities without the territorial 
state’s consent.136  Moreover, greater flexibility in conducting surveillance 
on foreign nationals abroad makes policy sense given the transnational 
nature of the terrorist threat and the difficulty of coordinating with other 
states in addressing that threat.  States are at risk for terrorist attacks that are 
planned elsewhere.  However, a state that is a likely target may not learn 
about that preparation in a timely manner, if it must rely solely on the 
cooperation of the state in which the planners are currently located.137  
Surveillance across borders that is appropriately tailored to national security 
threats helps connect the dots. 
Moreover, ECHR opinions interpret the privacy protections in Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is not limited by its 
terms to barring the “arbitrary” intrusions prohibited by Article 17 of the 
 
 130. Id. at 255. 
 131. Id. at 256. 
 132. Id. at 253–54. 
 133. See PPD-28, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
 134. See id.; cf. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 69–71 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding 
surveillance under FISA of alleged agents of the Irish Republican Army, citing to the 
statutory term “foreign intelligence information” as including information about “terrorism,” 
“national security,” and “the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States,” and stating 
that such terms were not impermissibly vague).  Section 702 does not authorize surveillance 
based on such grounds, and no reports tying the NSA to surveillance based on such grounds 
have surfaced, even after the worldwide scrutiny occasioned by Snowden’s revelations. 
 135. Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 309, 332–34. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010) (noting the 
need for “cooperative efforts” and “international cooperation” in counterterrorism); cf. Peter 
Margulies, Advising Terrorism:  Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 
63 HASTINGS L.J. 455 (2012) (discussing information asymmetries that justify flexibility in 
counterterrorism capabilities). 
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ICCPR.  True, European states that collaborate with the United States on 
surveillance still have to observe the provisions of the European 
Convention.  The United States, however, is not directly bound by those 
provisions.  Moreover, Article 8 of the European Convention contains 
broad exceptions for national security, law enforcement, and other 
governmental purposes.138 
In addition, both the United States and Europe follow minimization 
requirements for handling personal data acquired through surveillance.  In 
the United States, legislation requires minimization of data about U.S. 
persons,139 while minimization of data regarding foreign nationals located 
abroad is largely the province of internal agency rules.  In the United States, 
according to Robert Litt, the General Counsel of the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, conversations that are not relevant are “destroyed 
after a maximum of five years.”140  In Europe, legislation often expressly 
provides for minimization within a shorter period for data collected from 
persons located both within and outside a state’s territory.141  However, 
minimization requirements are substantial in both the United States and 
Europe. 
2.  Differences Between the United States and  
Europe in the Privacy Space 
European courts have imposed two requirements, notification and 
recourse, that U.S. law construes more narrowly in the national security 
arena.  Even here, however, European courts have acknowledged 
exceptions to the requirements that bring the European model and the 
American one much closer together.  Consider notification first.  A central 
principle of privacy law in both the United States and Europe is notification 
to individuals whose “personally identifiable information” (PII) has been 
obtained by another individual or entity or has been disclosed without the 
individual’s authorization.  This principle is a component of the U.S. 
Privacy Act,142 which has for decades served as a model for global privacy 
efforts.  Notification serves a number of purposes.  For example, it allows 
the individual to take appropriate remedial measures and helps deter 
unauthorized disclosures.  No entity, such as a healthcare provider, 
entrusted with an individual’s PII, wants to admit that it has not taken good 
care of this vital information. 
 
 138. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 118, art. 8(2). 
 139. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (Supp. V 2011). 
 140. See In re Gov’t’s Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification for 
702 Program, slip op. at 24 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011) (Bates, J.), available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/162016974-FISA-court-opinion-
with-exemptions.pdf; Robert S. Litt, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, 
Privacy, Technology & National Security:  An Overview of Intelligence Collection (July 18, 
2013), available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/57724442606/privacy-technology-
national-security-an. 
 141. Weber, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 337. 
 142. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a note (2012)). 
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In the law enforcement and national security contexts, however, both 
Europe and the United States recognize that notification can be problematic.  
Imagine federal law enforcement officials in the United States obtaining a 
warrant to tap the phone of the fictional mobster Tony Soprano (or an actual 
organized crime figure) and then dutifully informing Tony that he is the 
subject of surveillance.  Any subject of surveillance so notified would 
become far more guarded in his communications, thus undermining the 
purpose of the surveillance.  The United States has responded to this 
concern with categorical exemptions from the Privacy Act for national 
security and much law enforcement activity.143 
Europe also has exceptions to the notification requirement in national 
security cases.  These exceptions operate in a case-by-case fashion, but in 
practice are quite broad.  The ECHR has recognized that “notification might 
reveal the working methods and fields of operation of the Intelligence 
Service,” and that “the very absence of knowledge of surveillance . . . 
ensures the efficacy” of the surveillance operation.144  Accordingly, an 
agency conducting surveillance for national security need not notify 
individuals if it believes that notification will compromise the underlying 
goals of the investigation.145  Moreover, in Germany, officials can cite 
national security as an exemption to the otherwise central imperative to give 
individuals access to personal information accumulated about them by the 
government.146 
One feature of European jurisprudence is a requirement that an individual 
who has been notified or has otherwise come to suspect that he is the 
subject of surveillance must have recourse to an independent agency to 
investigate.  In Kennedy v. United Kingdom,147 the petitioner had been 
convicted of manslaughter in a controversial case featuring some missing 
and contradictory police evidence.  He had subsequently become active in 
an organization that questioned police practices, and he alleged that the 
government was intercepting his phone calls.148  Pursuant to statute, the 
petitioner filed complaints with the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), 
which was empowered under British law to investigate such complaints.149  
 
 143. Id. § 552a(j). 
 144. Weber, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 345; cf. Schwartz, supra note 126, at 776 
(observing that, under European law, secrecy is appropriate if “interests of the State justified 
secrecy”). 
 145. Weber, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 345. But see Rapporteur, Draft Report on the US 
NSA Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States and Their 
Impact on EU Citizens’ Fundamental Rights and on Transatlantic Cooperation in Justice 
and Home Affairs, 7, 11, European Parliament Comm. on Civil Liberties, Justice & 
Home Affairs, 2013/2188(INI) (Jan. 8, 2014) (by Claude Moraes), available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/jan/ep-draft-nsa-surveillance-report.pdf 
(acknowledging analogous exceptions before President Obama’s speech in January 2014, but 
arguing that NSA surveillance was not “necessary and proportionate” to those exceptions, 
and could be “used for reasons other than national security and the . . . fight against 
terrorism, for example economic and industrial espionage or profiling on political grounds”). 
 146. Weber, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 345. 
 147. Kennedy v. United Kingdom, App. No. 26839/05, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. 207 (2010). 
 148. See id. at 215. 
 149. See id. at 215–16. 
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The IPT can investigate claims of wrongful surveillance and award relief, 
including vacating warrants and ordering the destruction of illegally 
obtained records.150  When the IPT finds that a complaint is not 
meritorious, it merely informs the complainant that “no determination has 
been made in his favour.”151  Courts have upheld the statutory language 
requiring such Delphic replies, aware of the potential for individuals to 
game the system if a response provides more information about surveillance 
practices.  In France, recourse is more indirect, with a watchdog agency 
making inquiries about individual cases.152 
The United States currently lacks an independent agency that provides 
such recourse.  Instead, the United States has privacy officials who are 
integrated into virtually every executive department, including the 
Department of Homeland Security.153  The United States also has a Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, although that body has no power to 
order relief.154  President Obama’s announcement in January 2014 of the 
creation of new White House and State Department positions dealing with 
privacy will enhance this voice.  However, the lack of a dedicated 
independent agency may impede the recourse that European law requires.  
While individuals in the United States can contact privacy officials in 
various government agencies and may have standing to challenge 
surveillance in federal courts, each of these avenues is limited.155 
3.  Procedural Pluralism and Comparative Surveillance 
Despite these differences between the United States and Europe, 
procedural pluralism makes a compelling argument for U.S. compliance 
with the ICCPR.  The United States, particularly after President Obama’s 
speech and directive, provides notice of the grounds for surveillance 
comparable to Europe.  It provides oversight through courts, unlike most of 
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Europe.  Moreover, the president’s directive narrows officials’ discretion, 
precluding surveillance conducted to suppress speech, target minorities, or 
favor private business.  Because the United States meets these criteria, it 
should have leeway to tailor safeguards without buying into other items, 
such as notification and recourse, that are less familiar in the context of 
U.S. security surveillance and subject to broad exceptions under European 
law.  While, as I suggest later in this section, further reforms might 
reinforce the case, the argument from procedural pluralism is already quite 
solid. 
C.  Foreign Surveillance and Free Expression 
The NSA programs also do not violate the ICCPR Article 19 prohibition 
on inhibiting free expression.  Those protections, like the safeguards in the 
European Convention, are already substantially less robust than the free 
speech protections in the U.S. Constitution.  The ICCPR’s protections are 
qualified, allowing restrictions on the content of speech when such 
restrictions are necessary for national security.156  In Weber, the ECHR 
ruled that the broad German content-collection program did not infringe 
free expression, because its purpose and implementation demonstrated that 
it was not “aimed at monitoring journalists,” although the court did not rule 
out the possibility of incidental effects in this area.157  U.S. surveillance 
abroad that is carefully tailored to national security goals should not run 
afoul of the ICCPR’s protections.  President Obama’s January 2014 criteria 
meet these specifications. 
Under the ICCPR, U.S. officials could determine that certain speech, 
such as speech that calls for violence against the United States or its allies, 
should trigger surveillance of the speaker’s communications.  Speech of this 
sort could signal the speaker’s intent to actively participate in plots to 
engage in actual violence.  While surveillance based on the speaker’s stated 
views, without further evidence of participation in violence, might well be 
problematic under the U.S. Constitution, it would not violate the ICCPR.158  
One suggestion for reform of NSA surveillance offered by the President’s 
Review Group urged the government not to target non-U.S. persons abroad 
“solely” because of speech or religion.159  However, the ICCPR would not 
bar such surveillance, assuming that the relevant speech urged violence.160  
 
 156. See ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 19(3)(b) (providing for an exception to free expression 
where necessary for the “protection of national security or of public order . . . or of public 
health or morals”); Zana v. Turkey, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533 (interpreting a similar 
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group). But see Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 393 (2013) (arguing that Article 19 provides robust protection of free expression by both 
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 157. Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 307, 349. 
 158. See Zana, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533. 
 159. See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP., supra note 1, at 151 (Recommendation 13). 
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Moreover, the First Amendment would not bar U.S. surveillance based on 
extreme political views conducted on a non-U.S. person located abroad.  
My point here is not to second guess the robust protections provided by the 
First Amendment to persons inside the United States.  Rather, I aim only to 
clarify that the government is not and should not be constrained by either 
the First Amendment or the ICCPR in surveillance of non-U.S. persons 
abroad, as long as it does not aim to deter speech critical of U.S. policies. 
D.  Proposals for Further Reform 
While I have concluded that U.S. surveillance policy does not violate the 
ICCPR, further reforms could highlight this point and silence persistent 
doubts here and abroad.  These reforms could also remove any barriers to 
cooperation between the United States and foreign states, such as those in 
Europe, which are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights.  
This section identifies reforms that would add a public advocate to FISC 
proceedings, enhance FISC review of the criteria used for overseas 
surveillance, establish a U.S. privacy agency that would handle complaints 
from individuals here and overseas, and require greater minimization of 
non-U.S. person communications.  These reforms would signal U.S. 
support of evolving global norms of digital privacy. 
Although President Obama’s speech in January 2014 proposed a panel of 
independent lawyers who could participate in important FISC cases,161 
further institutionalization of this role would be useful.  A public advocate 
would scrutinize and, when necessary, challenge the NSA’s targeting 
criteria on a regular basis.162  Challenges would be brought in the FISC, 
after the NSA’s implementation of criteria.  The NSA would be able to 
adapt the criteria on an exigent basis, subject to ex post review by the FISC 
at the public advocate’s behest.  A public advocate and enhanced FISC 
review would serve three valuable functions:  (1) ensure that the FISC 
received the best arguments on both sides; (2) serve as a valuable ex ante 
check on the government, encouraging the government to adopt those 
criteria that could withstand subsequent scrutiny; and (3) promote domestic 
and global confidence in the legitimacy of processes governing NSA 
surveillance. 
A U.S. cabinet level privacy agency would also bolster the legitimacy of 
surveillance.  The agency could provide more regular recourse to subjects 
of surveillance, as the ECHR requires.  That change would ease the barriers 
to continued U.S.-Europe cooperation on counterterrorism.  A national 
agency would also work hand in hand with privacy officers in executive 
departments.  It would increase the leverage of those officials, who could 
advocate vigorously in internal debates, knowing that their views would 
also have a champion in a free-standing executive department independent 
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of the national security bureaucracy.  There are downsides to this proposal, 
of course.  A new agency would add expense, and create some redundancy 
in government functions.  Moreover, current models that provide recourse, 
such as the approach currently taken by the Department of Homeland 
Security,163 have been criticized as unduly burdensome.164  However, 
preserving cooperation with Europe and enhancing the overall legitimacy of 
U.S. surveillance provides a compelling justification. 
Each of these instrumentalities—a public advocate at the FISC and a new 
privacy agency—could also work to strengthen minimization requirements 
for foreign communications.  The NSA says that it disposes of all irrelevant 
communications within five years.  There may be ways to shorten this time 
and require even more rigorous controls on sharing of information that 
lacks a clear link to terrorism or other foreign intelligence matters.  More 
exacting minimization would also promote U.S.-European information 
sharing and enhance global legitimacy. 
CONCLUSION 
While critics of U.S. surveillance abroad denounce the United States for 
disregarding international law on privacy, that conclusion is far too facile.  
Unpacking the status of U.S. surveillance under international law requires a 
multistep analysis.  This analysis asks first whether U.S. surveillance 
abroad is, as a threshold matter, covered by the ICCPR.  It then asks 
whether U.S. surveillance violates the ICCPR’s Article 17, which bars 
“arbitrary or unlawful interference” with privacy.165  This Article concludes 
that the United States is subject as a threshold matter to the ICCPR.  
However, U.S. surveillance abroad complies with Article 17. 
On the threshold question, this Article concludes that Article 2(1) of the 
ICCPR is best read disjunctively on a state’s duty to “respect” treaty rights.  
The duty to respect ICCPR rights accrues both “within [U.S.] territory” and 
in any domain “subject to its jurisdiction.”166  The purpose of the provision 
and its drafting history, including key remarks by U.S. chief delegate 
Eleanor Roosevelt, demonstrate that the ICCPR applies to the armed forces 
of a state wherever those forces exercise effective control over areas or 
individuals.  However, the duty to “ensure” that others respect ICCPR 
rights only accrues within a state’s own territory. 
The Article then suggests that the effective control test is too narrow to 
apply to the domain of electronic and digital communications.  Because of 
the ease of exerting remote control over such communications, a virtual 
control standard is more appropriate and in keeping with Article 2(1).  The 
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extraordinary capabilities of the United States in this arena meet the virtual 
control standard because of U.S. intelligence agencies’ ability to monitor, 
filter, and, in some cases, modify the content of communications received 
and sent by and about subjects abroad. 
While the ICCPR applies to U.S. surveillance abroad as a threshold 
matter, U.S. surveillance is not “arbitrary” under Article 17 of the ICCPR.  
This argument incorporates procedural pluralism into the complementarity 
due both state law and other international norms.  Under the procedural 
pluralism framework, U.S. officials can choose among a range of 
procedural safeguards as long as the United States provides public notice of 
the criteria for surveillance and independent oversight.  European law is not 
inconsistent with this approach:  the ECHR has approved European state 
surveillance even absent the judicial role typical of U.S. surveillance and 
does not require notifying targets of surveillance when notification would 
jeopardize an investigation.  Moreover, the ECHR interprets the European 
Convention, which is not limited to the ICCPR’s bar on arbitrary 
governmental action. 
As President Obama’s speech and policy directive of January 17, 2014, 
demonstrate, the United States observes both the public notice and 
oversight values.  The U.S. focus on national security as a basis for 
surveillance abroad parallels the criteria used by European countries.  
Moreover, the United States has more judicial involvement than European 
states.  President Obama’s initiatives provide greater clarity about existing 
U.S. practice, and supplement that practice in a number of respects, 
including provision for a panel of independent advocates to provide input to 
the FISC in important cases. 
This Article’s argument is not a basis for U.S. complacency.  The United 
States should continue to do more to reconcile security with evolving global 
privacy norms.  In particular, U.S. officials should strongly consider more 
rigorous minimization requirements for the communications of foreign 
nationals outside U.S. territory.  U.S. officials may also wish to create an 
independent privacy agency and an institutional role for a public advocate 
at the FISC.  These changes are not required under the ICCPR, but they 
would signal U.S. willingness to shoulder the burden of global leadership in 
balancing security and privacy.  Absent that U.S. effort, other states may 
exploit the resulting vacuum, spawning results that serve neither security 
nor privacy rights. 
